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for cooperation with India and Pak-
istan during Operation Enduring Free-
dom. But several subsequent develop-
ments, some quite disturbing, ensure
that South Asia will remain critical for
years to come. They include the pres-
ence of the Taliban and al Qaeda mili-
tants in Pakistan and possibly Kashmir,
anti-American and anti-national terror-
ism in both nations, turmoil in the dis-
puted state of Kashmir, and a potential
for nuclear conflict between India and
Pakistan. On a more positive note,
Washington has improved its political
and military relationships with New
Delhi and Islamabad, which has raised
expectations.
Because of rivalry between India
and Pakistan, which began with their
independence from Britain in 1947,
the United States has never been able
to maintain close relations with both
nations simultaneously. India drifted
between nonalignment and an out-
right alliance with the Soviet Union,
while Pakistan was a staunch American
ally in the fight against communist ex-
pansion. When the United States
moved closer to India after the Sino-
Indian conflict in 1962 and again dur-
ing the 1990s following the breakup of
the Soviet empire, its relations with
Pakistan waned. Today the challenge is
translating increased influence in both
New Delhi and Islamabad into tangible
results in the war on terrorism, stabiliz-
ing Indo-Pak competition, and pro-
moting other American interests
throughout the region.
A fter languishing for fivedecades as a region of onlymarginal importance tothe United States, South
Asia became a major area of interest
for U.S. defense planners after 9/11.
The cause of this turnabout was a need
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Enduring Freedom
The campaign to deny Afghani-
stan as a haven for terrorists and crush
the al Qaeda network had a dramatic
impact on Pakistan, the closest foreign
partner of the Taliban. Pakistan had
helped consolidate their power during
the 1990s. Viewing the Taliban as a
friendly if fanatical regime that could
stabilize unruly tribes while providing
strategic depth, Islamabad was loathe
to see a return to insecurity on its
western flank. But faced by intense
pressure from Washington, President
Pervez Musharraf agreed to break ties
with the Taliban, provide basing and
overflight for coalition forces, deploy
troops along the Afghan border, and
share intelligence on terrorist groups.
In announcing this controversial pol-
icy reversal on September 19, 2001,
Musharraf stated that taking any other
course would risk unbearable losses for
Pakistan by threatening its economy,
long-term interests in Kashmir, and
strategic capabilities.
Though most mainstream Pak-
istani political parties upheld the deci-
sion to aid the coalition, Islamic fac-
tions responded in outrage. Some two
dozen religious parties joined in the
Pak-Afghan Defense Council to oust
Musharraf. Strikes were called, several
people were killed, and extremists
went to Afghanistan to fight with the
Taliban. Yet these actions did not in-
cite the nation against the government
or persuade the government to reverse
its decision on Afghanistan.
The president faced another
threat from within his military govern-
ment. Believing that he had sold out to
Washington, hardline officers in the
army and intelligence service were re-
luctant to disengage from Afghanistan
and provided incomplete or mislead-
ing information. Musharraf faced
being ousted by pro-Taliban officers
who were instrumental in the coup
that brought him to power and held
senior posts in the armed forces and
intelligence service. He moved to
counter this threat, sacking the intelli-
gence chief and deputy chief of the
army staff, changing commanders in
Quetta and Peshawar, and demoting
other senior officers associated with
the Taliban.
The Bush administration has gone
to great lengths to support the efforts
to maintain internal stability and im-
plement political and economic re-
forms in Pakistan while assisting coali-
tion forces. Washington has been
criticized at the same time for not pro-
viding sufficient assistance to Pakistan
for its crippled economy and military,
which is half the size of the Indian
armed forces. In reality the economic
benefits have been substantial: waiving
sanctions imposed after the nuclear
tests in 1998 and the coup in 1999,
rescheduling some of the $38 billion in
external debt, and allocating over $2
billion in economic support and secu-
rity assistance, including a $600 mil-
lion economic support grant, $30 mil-
lion in agricultural support, and $75
million in foreign military financing.
America has not yet offered the
kind of military assistance that many
expected (including F–16 sales, which
were terminated in 1990 because of
concern over nuclear nonprolifera-
tion) because it does not want to irri-
tate India and because it wants to de-
velop mutually agreeable terms for
future arms transfers. But the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy,
who led a 44-member defense co-
operation group team on a visit to
Islamabad in September 2002,
confirmed that military assistance
and arms sales would be restored
to help Pakistan modernize its armed
forces, especially air defense. This
group, which met for the first time
since 1997, also agreed on steps to en-
hance bilateral ties, including educa-
tion and training, resumed exercises,
and enhanced cooperation in counter-
ing terrorism.
Indo-American Cooperation
The support offered to the United
States after 9/11 was no less remark-
able. India, which had refused to be
drawn into military entanglement
with the superpowers and opposed
American presence in the region for
decades, suddenly extended military
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and production. It also sought to im-
prove consequence management for
weapons of mass destruction, humani-
tarian relief, cyberterrorism, and envi-
ronmental security.
Terrorism in South Asia
Increased incidents of terrorism
occurred in South Asia after the U.S.-
led coalition initiated the war against
the Taliban. Violence was recorded in
Kashmir as well as other parts of India
and Pakistan. In October 2001, 31
were killed and 60 were injured when
militants detonated a bomb in the leg-
islative assembly of Jammu and Kash-
mir at Srinagar. A Kashmiri terrorist
group claimed responsibility. Two
months later, an unidentified group
conducted an attack in New Delhi,
which ended in the death of 13 terror-
ists and security personnel. Vajpayee
blamed the affair on Pakistan-based
facilities and full logistic and intelli-
gence support. This change in policy
was based largely on a calculation that
the war on terrorism could hinder Pak-
istani support for insurgents in Kash-
mir. The United States did not accept
the offer of Indian bases because of a
decision to use bases in Pakistan and
wanted to avoid making cooperation
with the coalition more difficult for Is-
lamabad. But Washington regarded
this demonstration of support as part
of a growing accord in Indo-American
strategic interests. Earlier, in May 2001,
the Indian government had unexpect-
edly supported the U.S. missile defense
initiative. Americans had also become
aware of opportunities that defense co-
operation offered for contingencies in
Asia and the Middle East. When Presi-
dent George Bush met with Prime
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in No-
vember 2001, conditions were ripe for
developing strategic cooperation.
While visiting Washington, the Indian
leader spoke of the two countries as
natural allies.
This atmosphere of partnership
found expression in the revitalized bi-
lateral defense policy group. At a meet-
ing in New Delhi in December 2001,
agreement was reached on an unprece-
dented agenda of military-to-military
cooperation, exercises and training, re-
sumption of defense trade, and en-
hanced policy coordination. The
armed forces of the two countries also
began regular executive steering group
meetings to plan and review the details
of rapidly expanding cooperative activ-
ities. Convening in May 2002, the
group approved a number of items, in-
cluding training and exercises, acceler-
ated arms transfers, and technical co-
operation in research, development,
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Indian and Pakistani Missile Ranges
■ J F Q  F O R U M
militants and demanded that Islam-
abad clamp down on terrorists operat-
ing from its territory. To intensify the
pressure on Pakistan, Vajpayee recalled
the Indian high commissioner and
other diplomatic personnel from Is-
lamabad, suspended trade, halted
travel across the border, and banned
Pakistani aircraft from Indian air
space. He also ordered a massive mobi-
lization, deploying more than 600,000
troops to positions along the line of
control in Kashmir and the frontier in
Gujarat, Rajasthan, and Punjab. Signif-
icantly, he took the unprecedented
step of moving forces from the border
with China to face Pakistan. 
In response Musharraf ordered his
forces to mobilize and enacted tough
measures against extremism at home.
With U.S. officials joining the call for
firm action against militant move-
ments, authorities arrested two thou-
sand religious extremists and suspected
terrorists, including leaders of Lashkar-
e-Tayyiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and
three other groups. Musharraf also an-
nounced steps to control madrassas (re-
ligious schools that breed extremism),
freeze assets of suspected terrorists,
close down Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI) offices in Pakistan-controlled
Kashmir, initiate police reform, im-
prove immigration policies, and draft
antiterrorist finance laws. 
Even as Musharraf cracked down
on domestic Islamic militancy, he in-
sisted in a speech in January 2002 that
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the mobilization on both sides of the
border. The Indians asserted the right
to take every step necessary to stop ter-
rorism, including hot pursuit into Pak-
istani-controlled Kashmir. Islamabad
indicated that it was prepared to go to
war. Though both countries had mobi-
lized during previous crises in 1987
and 1990, the scope of mobilization in
2002 was unprecedented. For the first
time since 1971 they were actually
poised to fight. Indian and Pakistani
strike forces were activated, ammuni-
tion was moved to the front, and land-
mines were deployed. It was reported
that India had moved Prithvi short-
range ballistic missiles to the border.
The Indians tested a mid-range Agni 1
missile, and as war loomed the Pakista-
nis test-fired a mid-range nuclear capa-
ble Hatf 5 (Ghauri), a short-range 
Hatf 2 (Abdali), and a Hatf 3 (Ghaznavi)
ballistic missile. Musharraf, in an inter-
view with Der Spiegel, warned that his
nation was prepared to use nuclear
weapons in the event of hostilities.
As war seemed more likely, Presi-
dent Bush dispatched both the Deputy
Secretary of State, Richard Armitage,
and the Secretary of Defense, Donald
Rumsfeld, to the region. Before leav-
ing, Rumsfeld voiced concern
that the threatened war could in-
volve nuclear weapons. He added
that even if these weapons were
not used, a conventional war
would set both countries back
years in economic terms and in their
relations with the world community.
And it would prevent Pakistan from ef-
fectively monitoring its border with
Afghanistan and clamping down on
extremists at home. According to
Rumsfeld, “anything that distracts
them from helping us in the global
war on terror and trying to finish the
job in Afghanistan . . . is notably un-
helpful to us.”1
Just when hostilities looked in-
evitable, Musharraf pledged to Deputy
Secretary Armitage on June 7 that Pak-
istan would permanently stop infiltra-
tion by militants across the line of
control into Indian-controlled Kash-
mir. Tensions abated, but forces were
not pulled back. The Indians waited to
see if infiltration actually diminished.
the nation would continue to support
the cause of Kashmir diplomatically
and morally, which Pakistanis see as a
long-term freedom struggle of Kash-
miri Muslims against India. By con-
trast, most Indians believe that this
and other insurgencies in their coun-
try are fueled—if not guided—from
across the border in Pakistan. Another
suicide attack occurred in May 2002
against families of Indian soldiers in
Jammu. Officials blamed Lashkar-e-
Tayyiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed and
claimed that Pakistani ISI was in-
volved. According to India, Musharraf
was secretly directing militant activi-
ties in Kashmir or else the violence
was perpetrated by rogue elements in
his military and intelligence organiza-
tions. In either case, the Indians
planned to intensify the military pres-
sure until all manifestations of cross-
border terrorism were halted.
Pakistan also has been the site of
violent terrorist attacks, raising con-
cerns that Musharraf lacks control
over the extremists. An explosion at
the American consulate in Karachi in
June 2002 killed 12 Pakistanis. FBI in-
vestigators blamed the event on
Lashkar-e-Omar, a coalition of mili-
tant groups banned in January 2002.
This and other incidents, including
the bombing of a church attended by
foreigners in Islamabad, attacks on
French naval engineers in Karachi, a
missionary school in Murree, and a
foreign-supported eye clinic in Taxila,
and the murder of a reporter from The
Wall Street Journal, are all seen as ele-
ments in a plot against the Musharraf
government as well as U.S. and foreign
interests. These events, and subse-
quent arrests by Pakistani and Ameri-
can authorities, indicate that remain-
ing Taliban militants and some
members of al Qaeda have shifted
their locus of operations from Afghan-
istan to Pakistan.
Given the exodus of terrorists
from Afghanistan, Pakistan assumed a
more crucial role in Enduring Free-
dom. By October 2002, Pakistani and
coalition forces had conducted 99 raids
on suspected al Qaeda positions. In ad-
dition, 420 suspects were apprehended
and 332 were handed over to the
United States for interrogation, includ-
ing Abu Zubaida and Ramzi bin Al-
Shaiba, the latter believed to be in-
volved in planning the 9/11 attacks.
Pakistani troops have conducted nu-
merous raids in remote tribal areas in
the Northwest Frontier Province, mark-
ing the first time outside forces have
conducted military operations in this
largely self-governing territory. 
Military Tension
The prospect of conflict between
India and Pakistan increased dramati-
cally after the attack in December 2001
on the parliament in New Delhi and
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They also wanted to ensure that state
elections in Jammu and Kashmir
scheduled for September 2002 took
place. Pakistan also went to the polls
in October. Although violence and ir-
regularities marred both elections, and
Pakistan chose to go ahead with tests
of the Hatf 4 (Shaheen 1) ballistic mis-
sile, after the elections Vajpayee or-
dered Indian troops to withdraw from
the India-Pakistan border to peacetime
locations, but not from the line of con-
trol because he claimed that infiltra-
tion into Kashmir was continuing.
When Pakistan followed suit by
withdrawing its own troops, the threat
of war diminished and the economic
drain on both nations ended. The Na-
tional Security Advisory Board in India
estimated in a briefing to the National
Security Council prior to the with-
drawal that the ten-month mobiliza-
tion cost $370 million. Pakistani mobi-
lization was probably less expensive,
though it surely had a proportionately
larger effect on a fragile economy.
The Nuclear Danger
The latest standoff between India
and Pakistan cannot be reckoned in fi-
nancial terms alone. If war had broken
out, the death and destruction would
have been enormous. If the conflict
had gone nuclear, the human toll
would have been horrific. The Defense
Intelligence Agency estimated that
there could have been 17 million casu-
alties, not including deaths from star-
vation, radiation, or fires after the ini-
tial blasts. Rumsfeld shared that
assessment with Indian and Pakistani
leaders during his visit. Even though
tension eased considerably before the
Secretary arrived, the leaders of both
countries continued to treat their nu-
clear weapons and missile programs as
national priorities.
India and Pakistan are self-de-
clared nuclear powers. Neither are sig-
natories of the Nuclear Nonprolifera-
tion Treaty. India conducted its first
nuclear test in May 1974, which it de-
scribed as a peaceful nuclear experi-
ment. Both nations demonstrated their
capabilities in a series of explosions
during May 1998. New Delhi claimed
to have detonated a 12-kiloton fission
device, a 43-kiloton thermonuclear de-
vice, and three sub-kiloton devices.
Later the same month, Islamabad de-
clared that it had responded with six
explosions of its own, detonating what
nuclear officials described as one big
bomb and five low-yield weapons.
India and Pakistan possess stock-
piles of nuclear weapons components
and could assemble and deploy several
within a week. The size, composition,
and operational status of these arsenals
are guarded secrets, but sufficient infor-
mation exists in the public domain to
make estimates. Assuming the Cirus
and Dhruva research reactors yielded
25–40 kilograms of plutonium annu-
ally, India could have stockpiled
280–600 kilograms of weapons-grade
plutonium by the end of 2002.2 Al-
though there is also a program to pro-
duce highly enriched uranium, it is un-
clear if India has managed to produce
weapons-grade material. Experts have
determined that as little as 5 kilograms
and as much as 7 kilograms of pluto-
nium would be required for each
weapon. Assuming the worst and best
cases, the Indians could possess enough
fissile material for 40–120 weapons,
with 70 as the median estimate.
Unlike the Indian nuclear pro-
gram, which relies on plutonium, the
Pakistani effort is based on highly-en-
riched uranium. Presuming that the
Kahuta plant yields 80–140 kilogram of
weapons-grade uranium per year, at
present Pakistan could have 815–1,230
kilograms available for weapons pro-
duction. The amount required is
thought to be 12–25 kilograms, de-
pending on design. Also, the unsafe-
guarded heavy-water research reactor at
Khushab produces plutonium that
could be reprocessed to make a few
weapons annually. When the potential
inventories of plutonium and highly-
enriched uranium are added together,
Pakistan could have enough fissile ma-
terial to make 35–95 weapons, with 60
as a median estimate. (Indian and Pak-
istani material and weapons are sum-
marized in table 1 on page 33.)
Both nations have various aircraft
and ballistic missiles that could deliver
nuclear weapons. The United States de-
termined in 2001 that India would
most likely use fighter bombers for de-
livery since its ballistic missiles were
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decades. As Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto said in 1974, “Ultimately, if our
backs are to the wall and we have ab-
solutely no option, in that event, this
decision about going nuclear will have
to be taken.” More recently, a senior
officer reportedly stated that nuclear
weapons would be used only “if the
very existence of Pakistan as a state is
at stake. . . . Nuclear weapons are aimed
solely at India.” If deterrence failed,
nuclear command authority likely
would consider their use if India:
■ attacked Pakistan and conquered a
large part of its territory
■ destroyed a large part of either Pak-
istani land or air forces
■ proceeded to the economic stran-
gling of Pakistan
■ pushed Pakistan into political desta-
bilization or created large-scale internal sub-
version.3
At the height of the 2002 crisis, the
Indian defense minister broached the
possibility of absorbing a nuclear strike
by Pakistan and retaliating in kind.
Musharraf affirmed: “Nuclear weapons
are the last resort. I am optimistic and
confident that we can defend ourselves
with conventional means, even though
the Indians are buying up the most
modern weapons in a megalomaniac
frenzy. . . . If Pakistan is threatened with
extinction, then the pressure of our
countrymen would be so big that [the
nuclear] option, too, would have to be
considered.”4
Because of a growing dependence
on the part of India and Pakistan on
nuclear weapons for deterrence, it
would be difficult to disagree with the
Director of Central Intelligence: 
The chance of war between these two
nuclear-armed states is higher than at any
point since 1971. If India were to conduct
large scale offensive operations into Pak-
istani Kashmir, Pakistan might retaliate
with strikes of its own in the belief that its
nuclear deterrent would limit the scope of
an Indian counterattack.5
probably not ready. While several dif-
ferent aircraft could be used, the most
suitable are Jaguars, Mirage-2000s,
MiG–27s, and Su-30s. The Indians
have deployed short-range Prithvi 1
missiles capable of projecting a 1,000-
kilogram warhead, which presumably
is the maximum size of a nuclear de-
vice. But because of the restricted
range of the Prithvi missile, India is
most likely to employ either the new
solid-propellant Agni 1, which has a
700–900 kilometer range and was
rushed into development after the
Kargil conflict in 1999, or the Agni 2,
which has a 2,000–3,000 kilometer
range, when they become operational.
Pakistan has placed a premium on
acquiring ballistic missiles to offset
conventional military threats and en-
sure reliable delivery of nuclear
weapons. While its F–16 and Mirage 5
aircraft are probably nuclear-capable,
liquid-fuel Ghauri missiles developed
with North Korean assistance and
solid-fuel Shaheen 1 and 2 missiles
which were fielded with Chinese help
are more likely choices. (Delivery sys-
tems are described in table 2.)
Vajpayee has said that India is
pursuing a minimal but credible nu-
clear deterrent and will not be the first
to go nuclear. A government panel
drafted new doctrine in August 1999
that called for a nuclear triad of land,
sea, and air capabilities, a sound com-
mand and control system, and the
flexibility to rapidly shift from peace-
time deployments to full operability to
ensure the effectiveness and survivabil-
ity of the nuclear deterrent. India sub-
sequently reiterated its credible mini-
mum deterrent doctrine and revealed
the creation of a national command
authority, in which a political council,
chaired by the prime minister, would
be responsible for authorizing the use
of nuclear weapons, and a strategic
forces command would manage strate-
gic forces.
Pakistan accepts the possibility of
going nuclear first. Preventing India
from threatening national viability has
been central to its nuclear policy for
Autumn 2002 / JFQ 33
Table 1. Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Weapon Capabilities
Weapons-Grade Plutonium (kg) Weapons-Grade Uranium (kg) Weapon Capability
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High
India 280 400 600 unknown unknown unknown 40 70 120
Pakistan 5 15 45 815 1020 1230 35 60 95
the Indian defense minister
broached the possibility of
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Because any serious regional crisis
has the potential to escalate to conven-
tional and then to nuclear warfare, the
United States must remain deeply en-
gaged in the strategic and political af-
fairs of South Asia long after the Tal-
iban and al Qaeda are destroyed.
The events of 9/11 brought India
and Pakistan to the fore of U.S. na-
tional security interests and also pre-
cipitated significant changes in the re-
gion. It is unlikely that either New
Delhi or Islamabad will be able to re-
solve their mutual difficulties without
assistance from Washington. America
will be expected to play an active role
in helping both countries in counter-
ing terrorism, reducing the danger of
nuclear war, and promoting the social,
economic, and political wellbeing of a
large portion of the world population.
The close relationships with India and
Pakistan will offer the United States a
unique, albeit brief, opportunity to
meet this challenge. JFQ
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Table 2. Potential Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Delivery Capabilities
Range (hi-lo-hi) Source Status and most recent test
Indian Aircraft
Mirage-2000H 1,205 km France 2 squadrons, 35 planes in inventory
Su-30 MKI 3000 km Russia 50 planes purchased, 18 in inventory
Jaguar S(I) 850 km Britain/France 4 squadrons, 88 planes in inventory
MiG–27 ML 500 km Russia 214 planes in inventory
Indian Missiles
Prithvi 1 (SS–150) 150 km indigenous army version, in service
Prithvi 2 (SS–250) 250 km indigenous air force version, tested, in development
Prithvi 3 (Danush) 350 km indigenous navy version, failed test in 2000, in development
Agni 1 700–900 km indigenous tested January 2003, in development
Agni 2 2,000–3,000 km indigenous tested in 1999 and 2001, in development
Agni 3 3,500–4,000 km indigenous in early development
Pakistani Aircraft
F–16 A/B 925 km United States 32 planes in inventory
Mirage 5 PA 1,300 km France 50 planes in inventory
Pakistani Missiles
Hatf 1 80–100 km indigenous in service since mid-1990s
Hatf 2 (Abdali) 180 km indigenous/China tested May 2002, in production
Hatf 3 (Ghaznavi) 290 km indigenous/China M–11, tested May 2002, in service
Hatf 4 (Shaheen 1) 600–700 km indigenous/China tested October 2002, in service
Hatf 5 (Ghauri 1) 1,300–1,500 km indigenous/North Korea No Dong, tested May 2002, in service
Hatf 5 (Ghauri 2) 2,000 km indigenous/North Korea No Dong, tested April 2002, in development
Hatf 6 (Shaheen 2) 2,000–2,500 km indigenous/China not yet tested, in development
Source: This information is compiled from Jane’s Sentient Security—South Asia; Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft; Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, and 
various media reports.
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